Policy Report: Income Inequality in Denmark

DISCLAIMER: This article was taken from an essay I wrote for a university module hence the academic style.

Executive Summary

· Rising Income Inequality – Income inequality has spiralled in recent years, signalled by the Gini Index with falling middle to low-income shares and rising top-decile wealth.

· Causes – Changes in capital incomes have spearheaded income divergence at the top following fundamental changes in tax progressivity. Meanwhile, reductions in unemployment benefits and labour market changes have aggravated conditions for the poorest. Long-term processes of globalisation and technological change have contributed to a congested, polarised labour market and deregulated policy drift.

· Consequences – Economically, reduced opportunity and income polarisation from excessive inequality is associated with slowed productivity and credit market destabilisation. Politically, reduced representation and participation is likely, although offset by Denmark’s proportional system. However, populism is strongly correlated with economic decline.

· Policy Choices – Despite political resistance, progressive taxation could be increased on wealth and income. Labour market integration of vulnerable demographics, employment opportunities and unemployment benefits could all be increased to allow opportunity and security. Investing in Vocational Education and Training (VET) could also increase workforce participation and mobility.

· Policy Recommendations – Overhauling income tax progressivity at all levels to increase disposable income for the majority at the cost of a minority, alongside a wealth tax to target capital incomes. These would be introduced gradually towards the revenue-maximising rate to prevent a political impasse. Increasing VET subsidies would improve business attraction and provide lower-skilled individuals with career pathways.  Integrating vulnerable demographics through employer protections and subsidies and gradually raising unemployment benefits alongside municipality incentives for targeting employment would provide prospects to low-income individuals.

Introduction

Since departing from the post-war consensus, income inequality has grown exponentially through a global decline in redistributive and social welfare policies (Piketty and Saez, 2014). Denmark initially resisted global trends (Aaberge and Bengtsson, 2024), with the post-tax Gini coefficient at 0.14 in 1993 (Figure 1). However, subsequently inequality fluctuated until a sustained increase following the financial crisis, with the post-tax Gini coefficient rising to 0.22 by 2023 (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Gini Index Post-Tax 1980-2023, (World Inequality Database (WID), 2025)

Figure 2: Post-consumption Gini Coefficient in 5 OECD Countries (Our World In Data (OWID), 2025).

However, despite increasing inequality, the Danish Gini coefficient post-consumption (Figure 2) is tied bottom with Finland among the selected OECD nations, at 0.28 in 2022. Therefore, despite eroding social democracy through globalisation, flexicurity changes, welfare reductions, tax progressivity cuts and technological change, Denmark still ranks among the lowest OECD levels of income inequality (Petersen & Sæverud, 2024).

This report will dissect the critical causes of Danish income inequality in the next section. It will then analyse the economic and political consequences, leading to a discussion of potential policy options before finally suggesting policy recommendations to address this.  

2.    Causes:

2.1. Capital and Personal Income Tax Changes

Since the 1990s, following the introduction of Dual Income Taxation, tax policies have fundamentally evolved. This rule taxed capital proportionally whilst taxing labour progressively, therefore favouring those with assets (Alstadsaeter, 2007). Moreover, from 1987 to 2016 capital incomes were redistributed from the bottom 90% to the top 10% (Iacono and Palagi, 2022). As Piketty and Zucman predicted (2014), these rising capital incomes have driven income inequality.  The growth in the incomes of the top 10% (Figure 3) coincides with this reduction of capital gains taxation, with Top 10% Post-Tax National Income Shares soaring from 17.28% in 2003 to nearly 21% in 2023.

Figure 3: Top 10% Post-Tax National Income 1980-2023, (WID, 2025)

Furthermore, changes in wealth taxation have also facilitated increasing capital gains composition of income. Following the removal of wealth taxation in 1997, capital incomes rose as the incentives for capital accumulation increased. Moreover, the growth of rising capital incomes from capital accumulation is reflected by the growth of the rental price index in real terms from 46 in 1990 to 121.3 by 2024 (Figure 4).

Whilst Danish income taxation is relatively progressive, this has declined (Causa et al, 2016). Notably, the top marginal tax rate has fallen from 68% to 56% between 1987 to 2010 (Petersen & Sæverud 2024). Although the dual taxation system has become less regressive with a top rate of 42% on capital incomes, only 10% lower than the average top marginal tax rate (PWC, 2025), the decreasing taxation rates in wealth, income and capital gains have combined to decrease the progressivity of the Danish tax system. Resultingly, this is a key driver in rising income inequality.

Figure 4: Real House Price Index, 1990-2023, (OECD, 2025)

2.2 Labour Market Reforms

Danish labour market reforms, under the flexicurity model, have in recent years correlated with growing income inequality. This model was established in the 1990s and by 2000 had almost halved unemployment under the ‘Danish Golden Triangle’ of relaxed employment regulations in return for generous unemployment benefits and engaging Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs) (Pedraza et al, 2019).

Econometric analysis from 2005 to 2015 reveals that Danish flexicurity correlated with increased employment, welfare generosity and poverty reduction following the 2008 financial crisis. However, employment security drivers such as education and ALMP levels are correlated with higher income inequality (Pedraza et al, 2019). This suggests that whilst the flexible employment regulations have successfully improved employment rates and maintained them above 70% since 2008 (Figure 5), ALMPs and educational training fail to provide adequate opportunities.

Figure 5: Danish Employment Rate from 2008 to 2024 (Statistics Denmark, 2024).

Moreover, in recent years, the rise in disposable income inequality has correlated with decreasing unemployment benefits, such as the 2010 reform halving the duration to two years (OECD, 2016). Notably, for a single person previously earning 67% of the average wage, the replacement rate has fallen from 84% to 74% from 2001 to 2024 (Figure 6). This indicates that labour market reforms are increasingly contributing to income inequality by failing to support the lowest income groups.

Figure 6: Net 12-month Replacement Rate 2001-2023 (OECD, 2024).

Furthermore, new emerging trends such as the rise of young people who are Not in Employment, Education or Training (NEET) and increasing online platform work, particularly since COVID-19, have further added to the difficulties encountered in the labour market. The rise of NEET young people, with difficulties in access to transport, ALMPs and early intervention (OECD, 2024), and gaps in employment regulation with platform workers (Jacqueson, 2021) reveals the failures of current ALMP in integrating all sectors and demographics. Despite this, there are relatively high levels of employment and unemployment benefits. (Figure 7)

             Figure 7: Unemployment Replacement Rate (OECD, 2024).

2.3 Globalisation

Globalisation has facilitated the long-term rise of income inequality in Denmark, with several studies describing the correlation with wage inequality (Yay et al, 2016), due to the convergence of wages following increased international competition in manufacturing sectors. The correlating slopes of the Gini Index with trade volume indicate this phenomenon (Figure 8) as increased trade facilitates income inequality through increased market opportunities for high earners. Although free trade is beneficial in accessing resources, the process of globalisation is correlated with a push towards deregulation (Yay et al, 2016) that has contributed to declining taxation progressivity, technological proliferation (Autor, 2022), wage compression in industries vulnerable to competition (Autor et al 2015) and increasing freedom of movement.

Figure 8: Gini Index and Trade Volume 2000-2022 (World Bank Data, 2024).

Furthermore, increased low-skilled immigration is a symptom of globalisation. Whilst the ageing Danish population poses many risks that immigration can alleviate (OECD, 2024), the poor economic integration of low-skilled migrants has facilitated greater levels of income inequality in Denmark. Notably, the assimilation of migrants has been impeded by huge gaps in employment and educational outcomes (OECD, 2021), with a strong concentration of non-EU migrants in the bottom of the income distribution whilst EU-15 migrants occupy similar economic fortune to Danish natives (Petersen & Sæverud, 2024).

 Therefore, whilst globalisation has increased income inequality through the wage compression effect, the negative impacts of low-skilled immigration are mainly due to the failures of educational and Labour Market Institutions (LMIs) to integrate and optimise the benefits of immigration.

2.4 Skill-Biased Technological Change (SBTC)

Finally, the assimilation of technology has been critical in Danish income inequality, with recruitment demand increased for higher-skilled roles as automation replaces employment, reflecting the job polarisation thesis (Autor et al, 2006). This describes the technological impact of automating routine administrative middle to low-income roles, whilst conversely increasing demand for high-skilled roles involving technology. Consequently, in sectors such as engineering and finance, the average earnings of each quartile were the highest among all industries in 2023 (Figure 9).

The recruitment difficulties in the technology sector, despite intense demand (OECD, 2024), indicate the failure of the workforce to accommodate.  Notably, the employment rate for Danish adults educated in ICTs to at least Master's level was 89.9% in 2021 (OECD, 2025), significantly higher than the earlier average employment rate. This exhibits Autor’s (2022) concept of the ‘education race’, which increases demand and productivity for highly educated workers. Resultingly, SBTC has spearheaded global income inequality.

 Figure 9: Hourly Earnings by Sector (Statistics Denmark, 2024).

3. Consequences

3.1 Economic Consequences

Arguably, growth is inversely related to equity, with the view that redistribution can impede incentives (Baselgia and Foellmi, 2022). Recent years have seen huge leaps in economic growth while coinciding with increasing globalisation, facilitating the movement of foreign direct investment, freedom of movement, lower taxation, and reduced welfare as discussed (Figure 3, 7 and 8).

However, whilst inequality is required to some extent to harbour incentives, excessive inequality can hamper productivity. As Thévenot (2017) argues, suppressing opportunities for the lower-income groups stifles innovation and talent utilisation, therefore impeding productivity. With growth decreases despite the increasing Gini index in 2009, there is a weak correlation between Danish GDP growth and the Gini Index (Figure 10).  Similarly, across 31 OECD countries, Gini Index increases above 2 points by 2005 correlated with 4.7% long-term growth decreases from 1990 to 2010 (Thévenot, 2017).

Furthermore, although disputed in extent, rising inequality has been empirically linked with the financial crisis of 2007 (Treeck, 2013). Notably, the loss of lower and middle-income earnings necessitated excessive lending that inflated the credit market bubble unsustainably. The aforementioned Danish housing market, with soaring rental and mortgage costs, reflects how increasing consumption costs can induce excessive lending.

Overall, whilst limited inequality is necessary to incentivise growth, excessive inequality can induce slowed productivity and trigger crises.

Figure 10: GDP Growth and Gini Index 2003-2022 (World Bank Data, 2024)

3.2 Political Consequences

Additionally, increasing income inequality also bears vast political consequences for democratic participation and representation. Growing income inequality has empirically produced greater political inequality (Busemeyer and Goerres, 2023). This derives from reduced access to external political participation, like trade unions, alongside the decreasing substantive representation of low-income politicians, likely reducing low-income interest representation (Busemeyer and Goerres, 2023). As argued by Hacker and Pierson’s (2010) ‘winner-take-all’ theory, increasing inequality also correlates with lobbying by wealth-accumulating interests. This creates a vicious cycle of politico-economic inequality as policy drift favours the high-earners, evidenced by the growth of deregulation in Denmark.

However, amid growing inequality, Danish participation has remained high, with electoral turnout never falling below 82% since 1971 (Figure 11). Therefore, likely due to its proportional system correlated with increased redistribution (Iversen & Soskice, 2006) and representation, regulated campaign finance and lower relative inequality, Denmark has resisted global trends of political apathy following increased inequality. However, they may be marginally affected since failing to hit the peak of 88.72% in 1973 (Figure 11).

Figure 11: Voting Turnout 1971-2002 (Statistics Denmark, 2024).

However, crucially, Danish income inequality has influenced rising populism. Rodríguez-Pose et al (2023) demonstrated this correlation between ‘left-behind’ areas with support for populism. This has been observed in Denmark with a moderate correlation between increasing minority party vote (all parties excluding Venstre and the Social Democrats) with post-tax Gini index, both peaking in 2022 at 59.1% and 0.2152, respectively (Figure 12). The Danish People’s Party exemplifies this relationship with its 21.1% vote in 2015 following the migrant crisis, capitalising on anti-immigration frustrations (Luo, 2019). Moreover, as explored, increased migration is correlated to the process of globalisation, which spearheads economic inequality. Therefore, despite the representative nature of Danish political institutions, increasing economic inequality can induce increased populism and slightly reduced participation.

Figure 12: Post-Tax Gini Index and Minority Party Vote from 2007-2023 (WID, 2024; Statistics Denmark, 2024).

4.     Policy Options:

In tackling rising income inequality, the Danish government should consider the following policy areas. These will balance the productive benefits of reduced inequality and maximise tax revenue while mediating political resistance and economic growth: (i) Increasing progressive taxation on wealth and incomes to maximise revenue while ensuring business incentives. (ii) Comprehensive labour market reform, including protection for vulnerable demographics, increasing unemployment benefit replacement rates and increasing employment opportunities in response to SBTC and globalisation. (iii) Education and training schemes to boost mobility and counteract the risks of job displacement to automation.

4.1 Increasing Progressive Taxation

Following a period of declining tax progressivity and increasing capital incomes, restoring a higher system of taxation is critical to reinstating lower income equality. Atkinson’s (2015) recommendation to reach a 65% personal income tax through 10% gradual increments, above the current 52% top rate (PWC, 2025), pursue this post-war restoration. Although no country exceeds Finland’s 57.3% rate, Nordic countries’ egalitarian culture yields a higher tax elasticity of demand, with 3 Nordic nations constituting the five highest income tax countries (World Population Review, 2025). Although feasible, this should be hiked gradually until reaching the revenue-maximising rate, which depends on the national elasticity of taxation (Creedy and Gemmell, 2015). This optimises redistributive policies such as education and ALMP whilst accommodating for growth and capital flight.

However, the option of increasing top marginal tax rates overlooks further structural tax changes. Reducing the 33% effective base rate (PWC, 2025) would allow greater disposable income for lower-income groups. Simultaneously lowering these rates whilst raising top rates could alleviate the converging pre-tax and post-tax Gini difference, which has dropped from 0.28 in 2014 to 0.19 in 2023 (Figure 13).

Figure 13: Comparing Pre-Tax and Post-Tax Income Gini 2004-2023 (WID, 2025).

Furthermore, as wealth inequality overwhelms income inequality with the 0.39 difference in Danish market Gini of income and wealth (Figure 14), a wealth tax restoration is critical. Notably, high wealth concentration facilitates the rise of income inequality through passive income on growing assets, evidenced by increasing capital gains income composition following the wealth tax abolition (Jakobsen et al, 2018).

With the top 1% averaging DKK 1.9 million in annual income (Forbes, 2024), a 1% wealth tax on assets over DKK 10 million would target the wealthiest, consolidated by Atkinson’s (2015) suggestion of lifelong capital receipts to prevent evasion. Much lower than the 1980s 2.2% average rate (Jakobsen et al, 2018), this is pragmatically receptive to current economic conditions.

With the Danish egalitarian culture and gradual adoption disarming growth concerns, the leading obstacle to increased taxation is political circumstance. Despite Social Democrat dominance, Frederiksen’s coalition requires external party support with more economically liberal coalition partners in Venstre and The Moderates. However, with likely support from parties such as the Green-Left, a bipartisan approach to introducing a lower rate of wealth taxation is difficult but not impossible.

Figure 14: Net Personal Wealth and Pre-Tax Gini 2004-2023 (WID, 2025).

4.2 Labour Market Reform

Additionally, labour market reform is critical to addressing increasing income inequality with increased protections, welfare and opportunities.

Arguably, generous unemployment benefits, currently at a 74% 6-month replacement rate (Figure 6), could impede incentives (OECD, 2016). These justifications reflect the 2010 Danish reforms, where benefit duration was halved to 2 years (Causa et al, 2016). However, analysis across the OECD has shown that unemployment benefit reductions increase inequality (Peterson & Sæverud, 2024), outweighing minor improvements in employment incentives. Despite a high 76.4% employment rate following employment incentive reforms (Figure 5), unemployment appears to lie in opportunities rather than incentives.

 Employment security programs disproportionately benefit high-income individuals (Pedraza et al), whilst there is regional variation in municipality funding, which affects job-matching capabilities across Sweden (OECD, 2016). One policy option to address this would be adjusting municipal incentives based on employment success (OECD, 2016) to increase job-matching. This is effective by ensuring strong incentives in ALMP rather than resorting to blaming individuals.

With increasing immigrant workforce composition (Petersen & Sæverud, 2024), rising NEET population (OECD, 2024), and technological change popularising digital work, a pertinent policy option is expanding the inclusion of the labour market. As Jacqueson (2021) argues, expanding statutory regulations and welfare support for platform and agency workers would reduce income inequality for flexible workers. Migrant integration could also be facilitated through wage subsidies to compensate businesses for underdeveloped human capital. Similarly, ensuring access to lifelong learning for older populations is essential (OECD, 2021), addressing the workforce utilisation difficulties of an ageing population (OECD, 2024). These integration policies target changing workforce composition and demands following SBTC and globalisation.

Whilst there may be political resistance to increasing unemployment benefits and migrant integration, and municipalities could fear budget losses, the policy choices of increased job-matching and inclusion are amenable to Venstre and the Moderates’ views. Notably, Venstre seeks migrant labour market integration to reduce benefit dependence (Venstre, 2025).

4.3 Investment into Educational Pathways

Finally, investment in educational training schemes is critical to supporting a competitive labour market with opportunities for mobility among low-income groups.

Investing in human capital (Atkinson, 2015) addresses the wage premium of STEM subjects with the ‘education race model’ (Artur, 2022). With recruitment issues in the Danish technology sector (OECD, 2024), education is critical in tailoring individuals to deficient sectors and insulating the labour market from SBTC. Whilst Danish educational investment is 5.3% of GDP, above the 3.8% 2022 global average (Figure 15), intergenerational mobility between the US and Denmark remains surprisingly similar, suggesting high educational inequality (Landersø and Heckman, 2016).

Increasing VET funding could facilitate lower youth unemployment whilst also improving VET’s reputation, with uptake down 14% (OECD, 2024). Although suggested tuition fee introductions could tackle delayed youth labour market entry, they impede equal access to education. Conversely, VET policies increase income mobility and employment, with training targeted to in-demand sectors and therefore resistant to SBTC, as evidenced by the green transition (OECD, 2024).

Although Denmark’s more business-funded VET system has outperformed Sweden’s more centralised system (Dobbins and Busemeyer, 2015), SMEs are increasingly sceptical of the scheme’s cost-effectiveness (Cedefop, 2024). Nevertheless, using increased taxation revenue to increase wage and training cost subsidies could increase business capital and incentives whilst potentially increasing student wages. Increasing business interest could facilitate access to more attractive VET programmes, addressing the woeful 53% completion rate averaged since the 2014 reforms (Aarkrog, 2020). With cross-party support for VET programs (DA, 2025), appeasing businesses remains the obstacle to ensuring VET delivers attractive, financially-rewarding opportunities. Similarly, expansions in refugee accessibility and language training could ensure greater migrant integration, which heavily varies across regions (Jorgensen, 2021). Subsidising between 30 and 50% of VET student wages, contingent upon business completion rates, would incentivise businesses to provide more attractive VET programs with greater retention.

Figure 15: Education Spending until 2022 (OWID, 2024).

5.     Recommendations

To address growing income inequality, increasing labour market reform, tax progressivity and educational investment are essential.

The most politically viable change would be to grant greater wage subsidies to SMEs for VET schemes, allocated based on student retention and sectoral recruitment demand. This facilitates access for low-income individuals into high-demand sectors such as technology and healthcare, allowing escape from SBTC effects.

Although restoring unemployment benefit generosity may be unpopular, greater labour market integration through targeted training and protection alongside increasing municipalities’ employment incentives is feasible. This confronts globalisation challenges, such as a congested globalised labour market, through increased integration and opportunity.

A long-term gradual strategy of increasing the progressivity of income taxes is essential. This necessitates changing top and bottom marginal rates whilst targeting capital income through a wealth tax and capital receipts to prevent evasion. However, with delicate political conditions, this should be a gradual process that seeks to approach the revenue-maximising tax rate.

To maximise success, difficult proposals should involve a bipartisan approach with cross-party commissions to guide policies based on empirical findings. Referenda could also be considered if popular policies are obstructed. Increasing opportunity through education and ALMP, funded by increased redistribution, should be central to this response

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